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Abstract: We examined and analyzed methods used to create numerical equivalence between sites affected
by development and proposed conservation offset sites. Application of biodiversity offsettingmetrics in develop-
ment impact and mitigation assessments is thought to standardize biodiversity conservation outcomes, some-
times termed yield by those conducting these calculations. The youth of biodiversity offsetting in application,
however, means little is known about how biodiversity valuations and offset contracts between development
and offset sites are agreed on in practice or about long-term conservation outcomes. We examined how sites
were made commensurable and how biodiversity gains or yields were calculated and negotiated for a specific
offset contract in a government-led pilot study of biodiversity offsets in England. Over 24months, we conducted
participant observations of various stages in the negotiation of offset contracts through repeated visits to 3
(anonymized) biodiversity offset contract sites. We conducted 50 semistructured interviews of stakeholders
in regional and local government, the private sector, and civil society. We used a qualitative data analysis
software program (DEDOOSE) to textually analyze interview transcriptions. We also compared successive
iterations of biodiversity-offsetting calculation spreadsheets and planning documents. A particular focus was
the different iterations of a specific biodiversity impact assessment in which the biodiversity offsetting metric
developed by the U.K.’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs was used. We highlight 3
main findings. First, biodiversity offsetting metrics were amended in creative ways as users adapted inputs
to metric calculations to balance and negotiate conflicting requirements. Second, the practice of making
different habitats equivalent to each other through the application of biodiversity offsetting metrics resulted
in commensuration outcomes that may not provide projected conservation gains. Third, the pressure of
creating value for money diminished projected conservation yields.
Keywords: biodiversity yield, commensuration, conservation policy, English Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot,
ethnography, value
Co´mo los Contextos Econo´micos Dan Forma a los Ca´lculos del Re´dito en la Compensacio´n de la Biodiversidad
Resumen: Examinamos y analizamos los me´todos utilizados para crear equivalencias nume´ricas entre
los sitios afectados por el desarrollo y propusimos sitios de compensacio´n de la conservacio´n. Se cree que
la aplicacio´n de las medidas compensadoras de la biodiversidad en el impacto del desarrollo y en las val-
oraciones de mitigacio´n estandariza los resultados de la conservacio´n de la biodiversidad, que a veces es
denominada re´dito por aquellos que realizan estos ca´lculos. Sin embargo, lo joven que es la compensacio´n de
la biodiversidad en la aplicacio´n significa que se conoce poco sobre co´mo las valoraciones de la biodiversidad
y los contratos de compensaciones entre los sitios de desarrollo y compensacio´n son acordados en la pra´ctica,
o sobre los resultados a largo plazo de la conservacio´n. Examinamos co´mo se hicieron equiparables los sitios y
co´mo las ganancias o el re´dito de la biodiversidad fueron calculados y negociados para un contrato espec´ıfico
de compensacio´n en un estudio piloto de la compensacio´n de la biodiversidad dirigido por el gobierno
en Inglaterra. A lo largo de 24 meses observamos a los participantes de varias etapas de la negociacio´n
de los contratos de compensacio´n por medio de visitas (ano´nimas) repetidas a tres sitios de contrato de
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compensacio´n de la biodiversidad. Realizamos 50 entrevistas semi-estructuradas a los accionistas en el
gobierno regional y local, al sector privado y a la sociedad civil. Utilizamos un programa de software de
ana´lisis cualitativo de datos (DEDOOSE) para analizar textualmente las transcripciones de las entrevistas.
Tambie´n comparamos las repeticiones sucesivas del ca´lculo de la compensacio´n de la biodiversidad en las
hojas de ca´lculo y en los documentos de planeacio´n. Un enfoque particular fueron las repeticiones diferentes
de la valoracio´n de un impacto espec´ıfico sobre la biodiversidad en el que se uso´ la medida compensadora
de la biodiversidad desarrollado por el Departamento de Ambiente, Alimentos y Asuntos Rurales del Reino
Unido. Tuvimos tres hallazgos principales. Primero, las medidas compensadoras de la biodiversidad fueron
modificadas de formas creativas conforme los usuarios adaptaban los resultados a los ca´lculos de las medidas
para balancear y negociar los requerimientos conflictivos. Segundo, la pra´ctica de la elaboracio´n de diferentes
ha´bitats equivalentes a s´ı mismos por medio de la aplicacio´n de las medidas compensadoras de la biodiver-
sidad resulto´ en la equiparacio´n de los resultados que podr´ıan no proporcionar ganancias proyectadas de
la conservacio´n. Tercero, la presio´n por crear valor para el dinero disminuyo´ los re´ditos proyectados de la
conservacio´n.
Palabras Clave: equiparacio´n, etnograf´ıa, Piloto Ingle´s de Compensacio´n de la Biodiversidad, pol´ıtica de con-
servacio´n, re´dito de la biodiversidad, valor
Introduction
In recent years the mitigation practice of biodiversity
offsetting (BDO) and associated conservation policy
frameworks have expanded globally to secure con-
servation investment from infrastructure development
(Carroll et al. 2008; Quintero & Mathur 2011; Ben-
abou 2014). Preceded by wetland mitigation banking
and species banking in the United States from the
1970s and 1990s respectively (e.g., Fox & Nino-Murcia,
2005; Robertson & Hayden 2008; Pawliczek & Sulli-
van 2011), BDO is a relatively new conservation tech-
nology. This means that there are few detailed case
histories of offset implementation or of actual, as op-
posed to projected, conservation outcomes. We thus
examined the application of BDO in England under a
2-year pilot study by the Department of Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) to assess the proposal that
application of the DEFRA technical metric standardizes
assessments of biodiversity value so as to offer robust
numerical foundations on which to base planning for
development and offset sites in England.
We reviewed studies of BDO, focusing on the develop-
ment and application of metrics that create comparable
measures of biodiversity so as to demonstrate measur-
able gains (or yields) in biodiversity value. In researching
the BDO pilot in England (2012–2014), we focused on
the application in practice of DEFRA’s biodiversity offset
metrics. Over 24 months, we documented negotiations
and calculations that gave rise to a specific BDO contract,
set within a broader data set of site visits, interviews, bio-
diversity impact calculations, and grey-literature planning
documents for 6 DEFRA BDO pilot sites in England (data
held by L.C.).
Shaping the Calculation of Biodiversity Yield
Biodiversity offsetting policy and best practice guidelines
(BBOP 2009, 2012; DEFRA 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Gardner
et al. 2013) are intended to support biodiversity conserva-
tion outcomes by providingmethodologies for the techni-
cal calculation and apparent quantification of biodiversity
values. Such methods aim to determine commensurable
losses and gains in biodiversity at different sites,
thereby creating the possibility of offset compensation.
Biodiversity offsets inevitably pertain to 2 separate sites.
They constitute quantitative biodiversity gains reflected
as units or credits beyond a baseline over time at an offset
site. These predicted biodiversity gains compensate for
biodiversity unit losses at a development site and should
be additional to a projected counter-factual scenario in
the absence of compensation (Bull et al. 2014; Tucker
et al. 2014). Following the wording of a respondent in
our research, we use the term “biodiversity yield” to
describe projected gains in calculated biodiversity values.
A variety of metrological approaches exist for calculat-
ing and creating equivalence between biodiversity losses
and gains at different sites and temporal moments. In
application, these are normally linked to the use of a stan-
dardized reference system for the classification of habitats
or land cover (Quintero & Mathur 2011). In the United
Kingdom, the basis for such calculations is the biodiver-
sity offsetmetric developed byDEFRA (2012b), discussed
in more detail below. Habib et al. (2013:1313–1314)
state that “[e]xchanging dissimilar biodiversity elements
requires assessment via a generalized metric” and the
representation of biodiversity units by an appropriately
fungible currency or system of credits. An aim of BDO
is thus to standardize state and private-sector BDO audit-
ing methods so as to improve and stabilize approaches
considered ad hoc in practice (Gardner 2013: 1254). It is
noticeable, however, that these standardizing assessment
techniques andmetrics are themselves proliferating, such
that direct comparisons of offset quality between con-
texts becomes difficult. This phenomenon has also been
observed for assessment methods in carbon accounting
(Lohmann 2009; Lippert 2014). Tensions between ease
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Table 1. Habitat scoring system for biodiversity offsetting in England.∗
Biodiversity distinctiveness
Habitat condition low (2) medium (4) high (6)
Good (3) 6 12 18
Moderate (2) 4 8 12
Poor (1) 2 4 6
∗
Source: DEFRA (2012b).
of compliance for development interests and robustness
of conservation gain in terms of measurable biodiversity
yield (Maron et al. 2012) make studies of applied BDO rel-
evant for understanding how these tensions are worked
out in practice.
English Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot
Along with the United States, Australia, South Africa, and
Germany, England is considered at the forefront of devel-
oping BDO. In England, BDO has been enthusiastically
endorsed at the ministerial level (DEFRA 2013) and in a
number of recent environmental-policy documents and
reports (e.g., Lawton et al. 2010; DEFRA 2011; NPPF
2012). A DEFRA BDO pilot project ran for 2 years from
April 2012 to April 2014 and involved 6 local planning
authorities (Devon, Doncaster, Essex, Greater Norwich,
Nottinghamshire, and Coventry, Warwickshire, and Soli-
hull) as well as private-sector organizations (e.g., DEFRA
2012a; Apostolopoulou & Adams 2015; Carver 2015).
Key to the DEFRA BDO pilot was the metric for numer-
ically scoring the harm to biodiversity by a development
and then scoring the possibilities for onsite and offsite
mitigation of this harm (Table 1). These numerical scores
enable the calculation of commensurable losses and gains
of biodiversity in development and potential offset sites
(DEFRA 2012b; Hannis & Sullivan 2012; Sullivan 2013). In
applying the metric, development sites are first “mapped
and divided into habitat parcels” (DEFRA 2012b: 7)
and then classified according to the habitat designations
of the Joint Nature Conservation Committee, a public
body that advises the U.K. central and devolved govern-
ments on nature conservation (http://jncc.defra.gov.uk).
These mapped and classified sites are then scored ac-
cording to their observed condition and biodiversity dis-
tinctiveness with the scoring matrix of the BDO metric
(Table 1). Distinctiveness is determined based on the
guidelines in Treweek et al. (2010) and especially on
species richness, diversity, rarity, and the unique poten-
tial for the area to support species rarely found else-
where (DEFRA 2012b). The habitat condition grades are
adapted from the Higher Level Agri-Environment Scheme
(HLS) Farm Environment Plan Manual (FEP). A habitat
type scored as in good condition (specific to habitat
type within the FEP but usually based on percent cover
Table 2. Categories and subcategories (abbreviations in parenthe-
ses) of stakeholders interviewed regarding biodiversity offsetting in
England.
Category Subcategory
Regional and local
government
1. local planning authority (LPA)
2. natural England (NE)
Private sector 3. developer (DEV)
4. consultant ecologist (CE)
5. planning consultant (PC)
Civil society 7. conservation and wildlife NGO (NGO)
8. local resident (LR)
9. landowning offset provider (OP)
of indicator species, for example, cover of undesirable
species <5%) with high distinctiveness (incorporating
rarity and endemism) would be assigned the highest nu-
merical score. The metric thus aligns a numerical score
for an area’s ecological distinctiveness with a score for
its condition. Scores for an area of habitat range from 2
(lowest distinctiveness and condition) to 18.
Methods
We observed how biodiversity calculations and valua-
tions were made for a 2-year pilot study of BDO led by
DEFRA from 2012 to 2014. Field research followed three
phases andwas based primarily on repeat site visits to DE-
FRA pilot and voluntary offset sites as well as analysis and
comparisons of associated policy and planning texts and
successive biodiversity impact assessment (BIA) spread-
sheets. We conducted 50 semistructured interviews with
30 key actors, organized into three stakeholder categories
(regional and local government, the private sector and
civil society) and nine subcategories (see Table 2) (see
Supporting Information for interview questions). In re-
ferring to interview transcripts below, stakeholder cat-
egories for the DEFRA pilot sites are numbered 1 to 5
(as a sample of the 6 local planning authorities [LPA]
that took part in the pilot), and the complementary vol-
untary pilot offsetting site is denoted by a “comp” pre-
fix. Sequential codes for interviewees follow the format
of stakeholder category, followed by site number, the
individual within that site, and date of interview (e.g.,
LPA2.3 130515 means the third individual interviewed
within the LPA stakeholder category at pilot site 2, on
May 13, 2015). We conducted structured textual analysis
of interview transcripts with DEDOOSE, a cloud-based
qualitative data-analysis program that facilitates deductive
and inductive coding of text excerpts to enable assess-
ment of overarching themes and perspectives (Sullivan &
Hannis 2015). All respondents and offsetting cases were
anonymized.
From June 2013 to January 2014, we interviewed indi-
viduals from the ecology or green infrastructure depart-
ments of county or district councils where pilot sites had
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been established (see Supporting Information for inter-
view questions). Following interviews, we selected 2 of
the DEFRA pilot sites for the compilation of detailed case
studies. Our selection was based on the availability of
biodiversity impact as well as receptor site biodiversity
unit calculations (in this case study) and on the treat-
ment of protected species (in the second selected case
study) (Carver forthcoming). An additional private-sector
DEFRA pilot offset site was also selected for comparison
with a developer-led voluntary biodiversity offset initia-
tive. From January 2014 to January 2016, we made re-
peated site visits to observe BDO-related scoring activities
and negotiations at the 3 sites, conducted semistructured
interviews, and examined planning documents and BIAs.
This triad of methods formed the basis of our 3 detailed
case histories that tracked the design and development
of offset contracts in England from 2013 to the present
(data held by L.C.). A third and ongoing research phase
entailed textual analysis of documents connected with
BDOpolicy in England, interviews of participants in other
local government, nongovernmental, and private-sector
offset efforts (i.e., projects not part of the DEFRA pilot
study). These interviewswere categorized by stakeholder
type and analyzed as for interviews of stakeholders in the
DEFRA pilot study. The scope and depth of these case
studies and space limitations mean that, while drawing
on perspectives and findings derived from the broader
data set, for this paper we focused on the negotiated
calculations of development and offset locations that led
to one particular BDO contract.
We examined the process used to make biodiversity
calculations so that biodiversity values could be referred
to in terms of losses or gains (or yields) and prices could
be assigned to different sites in the offset agreement for
a particular offset contract. These values and prices were
negotiated over 32 months from March 2013 to Decem-
ber 2015. We drew on our multiple sources of data to
describe the development site and to present in detail
the metric calculations in the BIA applied to the devel-
opment and offset sites. We focused on the negotiation
process that ensued regarding the levels of mitigation and
compensation payments required and on the biodiversity
yields projected to arise from these transactions. The orig-
inal format of the BIA Excel spreadsheet (version 17.4) is
in Supporting Information. At the time of writing, local
government ecologists were using version 18 of the BIA.
The different iterations of the BIA affected the scores of
values arising from its application independently of the
biophysical dimensions of the areas being assessed.
Results
The Development Case
A planning application was submitted for delivery of 200
residential properties, a sports stadium, and playing fields
across 13 ha of mostly agricultural fields. Under the guid-
ance of the DEFRA BDO pilot and with the assistance
of a private offsetting brokerage firm, the development
became subject to BDO compensation payments in line
with the calculated value of affected biodiversity at the
development site. The proposed development site con-
sisted largely of amenity grassland, improved grassland,
hedgerows, scattered tall ruderal vegetation, and 4 ponds,
one with great crested newts (Triturus cristatus), which
are protected under the Conservation of Habitats and
Species Regulations 2010. The site formed the south-
western fringe of a small medieval market town and was
bordered to the north by an industrial and residential
development and to the west and east by roads with
open countryside beyond. The planning application was
submitted in March 2013 by the property owners, the
local football and bowls clubs, and a large residential
developer who would oversee the bulk of the planning
process and build, market, and sell the residential prop-
erties. Under new requirements shaped by the DEFRA
BDO pilot study, the local planning authority asked the
developer to apply theDEFRAmetric, in the formof a BIA,
to guide the biodiversity mitigation and compensation
measures required to offset the development.
The Biodiversity Impact Assessment (BIA)
The developer’s consultant ecologists completed site sur-
veys and used existing records to provide information on
the condition and distinctiveness of the habitats consid-
ered represented at the development site. These records
formed the basis of an ecological impact assessment re-
port for the planning application. Subsequently, to es-
tablish the site’s biodiversity unit baseline and mitigation
values in the format necessary for BDO under the DEFRA
pilot, the contents of the ecological impact assessment
report were translated into a BIA by an LPA ecologist and
the offset broker assisting the LPA with the contract. The
ecological condition and proposed mitigation actions at
the development site were determined by entering the
existing (i.e., pre-development) habitat scores into the
BIA produced by the County Council planning-authority
ecologist. The BIA spreadsheet operationalized the DE-
FRA BDOmetric to yield biodiversity unit scores for each
habitat type on the development site.
To arrive at these scores the development site was
first categorized by the LPA ecologist into habitat types
entered on separate rows of the BIA spreadsheet, each
with a code, description, size, and numerical score for
habitat distinctiveness and condition (Table 3 & Support-
ing Information). The spreadsheet allowed 3 sets of cal-
culations. The first (see Table 3 rows 15–28) generated a
habitat impact score (HIS) for the total scored habitat on
site prior to the development (46.68 biodiversity units,
cell O53).
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The second set of calculations (Table 3 rows 59–70)
yielded a habitat-mitigation score (HMS) for the total num-
ber of biodiversity units to be restored or created on site
so as tomitigate or minimize projected biodiversity losses
(16.78 units, cell O89). A notable feature of this HMS is
that almost 40% of on-site mitigation was projected to
be delivered through creation of a number of football
pitches of different sizes. The spreadsheet showed the
football pitches contributed substantial amounts of on-
site biodiversity unit value and had the largest spatial
habitat value of all mitigation activities. This mitigation
value was to be achieved by attributing biodiversity value
to the amenity grassland of the pitches themselves (cell
O63) and by allowing the perimeter surface area of the
proposed grassy margins to grow unmowed and thereby
to provide 0.73 ha of semi-improved grassland (cell O70).
Although receiving low habitat scores for both distinc-
tiveness (2) and habitat condition (1), the size of the
football pitches amenity grassland meant that in 5 years
this aggregate spatial area was calculated to contribute
4.07 units (Fig. 1). After 15 years, the grassy margins
would contribute a further 2.29 units cell. In total, then,
the football pitches would eventually make up 6.36 units
of biodiversity value of 16.78 units of total on-site mitiga-
tion and habitat creation.
The third set of calculations, through comparison of
scores from the first and second calculation sets, yielded
the residual biodiversity net loss. This value indicated
howmany biodiversity units would need to be purchased
formitigation purposes if an additional off-site offset were
needed. This net loss or gain value was the habitat bio-
diversity impact score (HBIS) generated by subtracting
HIS from HMS. The HBIS was calculated as an overall
loss of 31.90 biodiversity units (Table 3, cell O91). It is
this calculated biodiversity value that required an off-site
offset to satisfy planning requirements for mitigation of
on-site development impacts on biodiversity.
The Offset Site
Interviews showed that established conservation non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and Wildlife Trusts
were typically perceived as possessing the “experience
and expertise to ensure delivery” (LPA2.1 020714) of
offsets, and as being familiar and experienced with con-
tracted management and improvement of habitat. The
offset site identified by the council for the supply of
scored offset units comparable to the HBIS score above
was a 5-ha grassland meadow 5 km northeast of the de-
velopment, acquired by a local wildlife and conservation
NGO in 2013. The site consisted of a meadow of species-
rich, semi-improved grassland in close proximity to a
local site of special scientific interest (SSSI). The site sup-
ported 5 orchid species, including the largest population
of greater butterfly orchid (Plantanthera chlorantha)
in the county. It also supported 4 of the county’s 6 rare
farmland butterflies, 3 of which (grizzled skipper [Pyrgus
malvae], dingy skipper [Erynnis tages], and white-letter
hairstreak [Satyrium w-album]) are designated as biodi-
versity priority species under the 2007 U.K. Biodiversity
Action Plan. At the time of assessment the NGO was not
investing in much active management of the site due to
limited funding, despite the site’s excellent ecological
enhancement potential (NGO5.1 241114).
A BIA was conducted for the offset site to calculate
its baseline and projected biodiversity values. This BIA
indicated the NGO had intended to bring the grassland
to a moderate condition but with the offset payments
from the developer would be able to fully restore the
site and thus provide a lowland meadow of national im-
portance (Fig. 1). These improvements would thereby
demonstrate conservation additionality (NGO5.1 Offset
Site Draft Management Plan 112013). It was hoped that
with appropriate interventions 2 other rare farmland but-
terflies, also designated nationally as biodiversity priority
species, would establish colonies on the site (NGO 5.1
Offset Site Draft Management Plan November 2013).
To achieve this conservation additionality, the pre-
dicted biodiversity yield was quantified and the cost was
estimated according to a management plan to be carried
out by the offset provider. The BDO Draft Management
Plan was written by the NGO conservation officer. Costs
included NGO volunteer and paid staff and external con-
tractor workforces, materials, and capital or lease pay-
ments for the land itself (NGO5.2 280115). The predicted
budget for improvement and 30 years of management
at the offset site totaled £204,076, of which £98,030
would come from the conservation NGO budget and
£106,046 from the biodiversity offset payment made by
the developers (NGO5.1 Offset Site Draft Management
Plan 112013). The developer would pay a further 20%
for brokerage fees (OB5.1 241114) and legal fees for ar-
ranging the contracts among parties (NGO5.2 280115).
Negotiating Biodiversity Calculations
Tracing successive calculations of HMS, HIS, and HBIS
scores showed additionally that the costs arrived at above
were also the outcome of negotiations between stake-
holders. These negotiations frequently involved changing
the numerical scores in the first BIA for the development
site. Over the course of the planning process, the calcu-
lated baseline biodiversity value of the development site
was reduced by almost 48% from 48.68 units in BIA draft
1 (Table 3 & Supporting Information) to 25.52 units in
draft 2. This decrease in habitat value occurred through
category changes to the condition of existing habitats.
Changes made to the condition values of the baseline
habitats on site and identified through comparisons of
drafts of the BIA excel sheets had dramatic effects on
financial compensation requirements (Table 4). These
changes included lowering the perceived condition of
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Figure 1. Map of development site in the United Kingdom (a) before and (b) after development.
Conservation Biology
Volume 31, No. 5, 2017
1062 Biodiversity Offsetting
4.88 ha of improved grassland on the development site
from moderate to poor condition such that the BIA F3
baseline value of 19.52 in Table 3 (cell O26) became
9.76 units. The adjustment to the condition score con-
stituted a 50% reduction of baseline biodiversity value
for this area. Because of this habitat parcel’s size this
single modification amounted to an almost 20% overall
reduction to the baseline biodiversity unit value for the
entire development site. The same process was applied
to improved and amenity grasslands in different areas.
Whether these modifications increased or decreased the
final compensation costs of development-planning appli-
cationswas built into the numerical adjustments that took
place. Other iterations to the BIA over the course of the
pilot study included adding category values to the BDO
metric (Table 1) with the odd numbers 1, 3 and 5 for
local habitat types that had greater regional than national
distinctiveness and rarity (NGO5.1 241114), as well as
extensive formatting changes and numerous editions to
make the calculator more user friendly and manageable
(OB5.2 050114).
One explanation for these modifications is that local
planning authorities had a relatively limited ability to
determine the exact condition of the habitats under con-
sideration. Only a few habitats were visited and verified
by a county ecologist (LPA5.2 241114) because of the
widespread shortage of ecological expertise within local
governments more generally (NGO 270116, NGOComp1
290116). Often the ecological data were assembled and
cross-referenced remotely against data in the ecological
assessment report and biological and historical data held
by the council offices at the district council’s Biological
Records Centre. Indeed, the good quality and extensive
scope of the ecological data held by the county council
and the size of the county’s ecological team were consid-
ered anomalous in this case (LPA5.2 241114).
Underlying the overall downward recalculation of the
development site’s baseline value from 48.68 to 25.52
units, however, was a view that the first BIA calculations
would create too large a future compensation package,
thereby threatening the financial viability of the devel-
opment (DEV5.1 060315). The initial calculation for the
biodiversity offset compensation package was £300,000.
The developer and the local planning authority met and
the baseline habitat condition assessments for many areas
on site were adjusted downward to produce the new
figure of 25.52 biodiversity units in the second draft
(Table 4). Described as “ . . . something we could live
with” (DEV5.1 060315), the ensuing revised cost for the
final compensation package was £120,000.
Discussion
Our case study provides an in-depth history of the assess-
ments, calculations, and negotiations of biodiversity and
financial values for a BDO compensation contract. This
case illustrates several problems for biodiversity conser-
vation predicted in the theoretical literature on BDO.
We considered 3 problems in particular and focused on
their broader implications for biodiversity conservation
through the implementation of BDO.
First, evidence from repeat site visits to this and other
pilot offsetting sites in England over 24months (data held
by L.C.) showed thatmaking theDEFRAmetric applicable
to real-life planning cases is a process of constant iteration
and trial and error. Our BDO case history illustrates in
particular how metrics for deciding biodiversity values
at development and off-site mitigation sites are being
redesigned during application and are generating numer-
ical values that are then further negotiated and adjusted.
Instead of acting as technical means for the standardized
production of impartial and objective calculations based
on observed site characteristics, the new metrics associ-
ated with BDO design and recommendations are being
used differently by different actors with competing inter-
ests in negotiations. Such differences in application may
be appropriate in response to real-world complexities,
but they conflict with the stated aims in BDO policy de-
sign for standardization and comparability. The nexus of
competing development, conservation, and LPA interests
meant that biodiversity values calculated through appli-
cation of the metric were adjusted downward to facilitate
a compensation package that was cheaper for develop-
ers. In a similar case at another development site, the
development firm negotiated a reduction in biodiversity
offset compensation from £300,000 to £90,000 (DEV5.1
060315) (also see the example in Sullivan [2013]). As
predicted in theory (Walker et al. 2009; Hannis & Sullivan
2012), then, these case studies seem consistent with con-
cerns that an emphasis on market values for biodiversity
conservation and compensation will encourage develop-
ers, as purchasers of impact compensation, to push prices
downward so as to lower their costs. In doing so, both
the quality and quantity of conservation yield through
BDO may also be reduced.
Second, our case shows how the commensuration pro-
cess works in practice to make different habitats equiva-
lent to each other through the application of BDOmetrics
(Tables 1 and 3). Numerical indicators form proxies for
qualitatively different ecological assemblages, calculated
with the aid of the DEFRA biodiversity metric as repre-
sented by the BIA Excel spreadsheet calculations. Some-
times these commensuration processes generated unin-
tuitive outcomes. It was unclear, for example, how the
sports pitches, with 6.36 units of biodiversity value, was
equivalent to 6.36 units of high-quality grassland habitat
that supports a range of biodiversity-action-plan species
at the offset site. The proposed mitigation value of the
sports pitches, determined to be habitats of low distinc-
tiveness and poor condition, was achieved because they
were the largest habitat type within the development.
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Table 5. Biodiversity units calculated for football pitches as amenity
grassland at the development site compared with an equivalent area of
species-rich semi-improved grassland at the offset site.
Development site Offset site
Size (ha) 2.44 (3.8 full-size
football pitches)
0.64
Habitat type
(qualitative
category)
amenity grassland species-rich
semi-improved
grassland
(lowland
meadow)
Biodiversity units 4.07 5.48
This outcome shows how the numerical abstractions in-
herent in the English BDO process can lead to large areas
of low value for biodiversity becoming commensurate
with small, unique areas of high biodiversity value (Sul-
livan 2013; Carver 2015) (Table 5). The packaging of
football pitches as habitat for on-site mitigation reduced
the financial compensation value in the final offset cal-
culations by decreasing offset unit requirements by an
equivalent number of biodiversity units.
Finally, elements of these 2 problems suggest that the
pressure to create value for money (i.e., more conserva-
tion gains for less money) in compensation strategies for
conservationmay be pushing BDO in directions that favor
the growth of market values and exchanges for offset
units, but that may work against the robust generation
of conservation value (Hannis & Sullivan 2012; Dauguet
2015). Observations in our case study confirm this ten-
dency. For example, although conservation NGOs were
considered convenient offset providers by district coun-
cils (LPA5.1 010215),councils also recognized that to
achieve market liquidity in offset units private landown-
ers would have to play a significant role. Indeed, a bar-
rier to the development of BDO in England has been
a shortage of offset sites from which to purchase bio-
diversity offset credits, as confirmed in DEFRA’s pilot
evaluation report (Baker et al. 2014). The local authority
in our case thus forged partnerships with organizations
that could assist in stimulating and brokering a greater
supply of offset credits and receptor sites through private
landowners. High transaction costs for site identification
and preparation and legal fees are fostering economies of
scale by bringing offset provision together with the eco-
nomically astute ways that large commercial landowners
can manage their farms (OB5.2 020315 and as predicted
by Sullivan and Hannis [2015]). This is expected to result
in a better supply of offset credits from newly formed
habitat banks. Emerging offset brokerage firms hope that
a high supply of offset credits will improve credit-supply
competition and result in cheaper prices for developers
seeking compensation. It is this combination of commer-
cial outlook, farmer experience, and land management
that makes the corporate broker now partnering with
the county council confident that with this approach
they can produce a “good biodiversity yield per hectare”
across multiple sites (OB5.2 020315). In doing so, BDO
is becoming further aligned with commercial agricul-
tural productivity agendas that emphasise efficiencies
and scale of production (i.e., agricultural yield).
The casewe examinedwas of a biodiversity offset to be
provided directly by a conservation NGO to a local plan-
ning authority. Despite months of preparation and con-
siderable staff costs, the developer eventually rejected
the proposed offset site in favor of developing an offset
arrangement with the farmer issuing the land for develop-
ment in the first place (OB5.1 140116). The calculations
and negotiations presented here are nonetheless valuable
as a detailed example of how the DEFRA metric is be-
ing applied to biodiversity assessments at different sites.
In tracking, documenting, and analyzing the calculations
and negotiations in this and other cases, we observed that
although BDO applies technical and apolitical practices
to calculate equivalence and commensurability between
sites of biodiversity damage and conservation investment,
in practice the process is subject to frequent changes to
the input values of the metrics and valuation criteria to
balance these in order to meet the conflicting interests of
stakeholders. As such, instead of confining the decision-
making process to a neutral calculative and technical
framework, the process opens up avenues throughwhich
stakeholders can negotiate, and sometimes struggle over,
specific outcomes (Coralie et al. 2015; Sullivan & Han-
nis 2015). As suggested by Walker et al. (2009:149), the
concern is that “biodiversity protection interests will fail
to counter motivations for officials to resist and relax
safeguards to facilitate exchanges and resource devel-
opment at cost to biodiversity.” Application of scoring
practices that create numerical values may help stimu-
late greater compensation payments for biodiversity loss
in the English planning system and elsewhere, thereby
supporting greater biodiversity outcomes (although see
Carver 2015). Obscured within these technical calcula-
tion practices, however, and as predicted by Salzman and
Ruhl (2000), are additional value judgments and struggles
over arriving at the perceived right numerical values that
straddle competing demands such that they are economi-
cally palatable, politically pragmatic, and ecologically co-
herent. Whether or not biodiversity yields are achieved
through these negotiations depends on the bargaining
powers of stakeholders, beyond the application of stan-
dardized practices to calculate and commensurate biodi-
versity losses and gains.
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